Why do comfortable citizens turn against democracy?

Four concepts

Act 1 · The era of rapid growth

For most of history, growth was negligible.

From the founding of Athens to the steam engine, output grew by about 0.1% a year, largely through population growth; most people died no richer than they were born.

Compounded over 50 years, 0.1% a year yields about 5%; 1% yields 64%; 2.5% yields 344%.

England reached about 1% a year in the 18th century and about 2.5% for much of the 19th: progress became perceptible within a lifetime.

The first anomaly: growth without equality.

Between 1827 and 1851, England’s economy grew by about 80%, but inequality rose as rapidly — from a level comparable to today’s Iceland to one comparable to today’s India.

The second anomaly: broadly shared growth.

The income share of the top 1% (Piketty) fell from 15–20% in France and the United Kingdom and almost 25% in the United States in 1928 to under 10% and no more than 12% respectively by 1960.

Prosperity was tangible: refrigerators, cars and televisions became ordinary household possessions.

Act 2 · Stagnation

Since the 1980s, growth has slowed markedly.

US growth fell from 4% a year in the first two postwar decades to 2% in the past two; French growth from 5% to about 1.5%. Germany is similar; Italy worse.

Inequality has risen on both sides of the Atlantic, back to 1930s levels.

The living standard of the median US household doubled between 1935 and 1960 and doubled again by 1985; since then it has been essentially flat.

The intergenerational promise has eroded.

Of Americans born in 1940, 92% out-earned their parents by age 30; of those born in 1980, only 50%.

By decade of birth: 1940s 92% · 1950s 79% · 1960s 62% · 1970s 61% · 1980s 50% (Chetty et al., cited by Mounk).

A Guardian study found real-terms wage losses among millennials in the US, Italy, France, Spain, Germany and Canada, often predating 2008.

The same deceleration appears beyond income.

US life expectancy at birth rose from 49 (born 1900) to 68 (born 1950) and 77 (born 2003): the gains are diminishing.

Case and Deaton find that mortality among white Americans aged 45–54 fell by 2% a year between 1978 and 1998, then rose by 0.5% a year.

Act 3 · Fear of the future

Growth conferred legitimacy on democratic institutions.

Politicians were seldom popular, but citizens markedly better off than their parents, expecting their children to fare better still, judged the system effective.

Without that expectation, more voters are willing to disrupt the system and accept the uncertainty.

The puzzle: populist voters are not the poorest.

In Gallup data on 125,000 Americans, those favourable to Trump had a mean household income of nearly $82,000, against a little over $77,000 for the rest, and were less likely to be unemployed.

Many commentators inferred that economic anxietyEconomic anxietyApprehension about one’s economic trajectory, as distinct from one’s present position — the chapter’s central distinction. explains little.

Prospects, not present income, explain the vote.

Trump supporters were less likely to hold a degree or a professional occupation, and more exposed to globalisation and automation; their communities had poorer health, lower mobility and weaker social capital.

Jed Kolko: routine occupations predicted a Trump vote, and the swing from Romney was largest where unemployment was higher, job growth slower and earnings lower.

“Economic anxiety is about the future, not just the present.”

— Jed Kolko

Ben Delsman: 21 of the 22 states most exposed to automation voted for Trump, all 15 of the least exposed for Clinton; each extra point of exposure corresponds to roughly +3 points of Trump vote share.

The decisive group is not the poorest but those most dependent on the existing order, with the most to fear from its decline.

Affluence without momentum.

Western democracies remain the wealthiest societies in history, yet no longer promise each generation improvement; Mounk asks whether a decent standard of living will suffice.

Like Bertrand Russell’s chicken, fed daily and confident the feeding will continue, we extrapolate from the past. Every stable democracy on record has been affluent and growing; none has been affluent and stagnant.